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Symmetric collective attacks for the eavesdropping of symmetric quantum key
distribution
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M.I.T. - Research Laboratory of Electronics, Cambridge MA 02139, USA
We consider the collective eavesdropping of the BB84 and six-state protocols. Since these protocols
are symmetric in the eigenstates of conjugate bases, we consider collective attacks having the same
kind of symmetry. We then show how these symmetric collective attacks are sufficiently strong in
order to minimize the Devetak-Winter rates. In fact, it is quite easy to construct simple examples
able to reach the unconditionally-secure key-rates of these protocols.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, Renner [1] has shown how to reduce quantum key distribution (QKD) to the cryptoanalysis of collective
attacks. This is possible by turning an arbitrary QKD protocol into a permutation invariant one, where Alice and Bob
publicly agree on a random permutation which they use to reorder their classical values just at the end of the quantum
communication and before any other classical processing of the data [1]. Thanks to this permutation invariance, a
finite quantum de Finetti theorem [2] can be applied to the cryptographic scenario and, therefore, the most general
coherent attack can be approximated by a mixture of collective attacks. As a consequence, a bound on the key-rate
for all the possible collective attacks becomes automatically a bound for the most general attacks allowed by quantum
mechanics. Since a natural upper bound for the eavesdropper’s information IAE is given by the Holevo information
χAE , the minimization of the Devetak-Winter rate [3, 4] RDW := IAB −χAE on the class of collective attacks provide
a natural lower bound for the unconditionally-secure key-rate.
In this paper we consider the cryptoanalysis of the BB84 and the six-state protocols. Such QKD schemes can be
called symmetric since they are based on the symmetric exploitation of the eigenstates of conjugate bases (mutually
unbiased bases). It is then intuitive to consider collective attacks whose action is symmetric on these eigenstates,
resulting in uniform contractions within the Bloch sphere. Such symmetric collective attacks are in fact a trivial
extension of the symmetric individual attacks defined by Gisin et al. [5]. The naive result of this paper is that, for
symmetric QKD schemes like the BB84 and six-state protocols, the minimization of the Devetak-Winter rates can be
restricted to the class of symmetric collective attacks. In fact, it is very easy to find simple examples of symmetric
collective attacks whose Devetak-Winter rates correspond exactly to the unconditionally-secure key-rates of these
symmetric protocols.
II. THE BB84 PROTOCOL AND ITS SYMMETRIC EAVESDROPPING
In the BB84 protocol [6], two honest users (Alice and Bob) randomly choose between two conjugate bases, i.e.,
the Z-basis {|0〉 , |1〉} (the eigenstates of the Pauli operator Z) and the X-basis {|+〉 , |−〉} (the eigenstates |±〉 =
2−1/2 (|0〉 ± |1〉) of the Pauli operator X). Alice encodes a logical bit into her basis σA = Z ∨ X according to the
mapping 0¯ = |0〉 ∨ |+〉 and 1¯ = |1〉 ∨ |−〉. The signal state |u〉 with u = {0, 1,+,−} is then sent to Bob through the
noisy channel E , who will project the output state ρB(u) := E (|u〉 〈u|) onto his basis σB = Z ∨X in order to decode
Alice’s logical bit. At the end of the quantum communication, Alice and Bob publicly agree a random permutation
of their binary data (called the raw key). Then, they disclose all their bases (basis reconciliation) and keep only
the compatible data, forming the so-called sifted key. Such a key is still affected by errors due to the noise of the
channel and the corresponding error rate is called QBER (for quantum bit error rate). The QBER is computed during
the subsequent error estimation, where the honest users publicly compare a (small) random subset of the sifted key.
From the knowledge of the QBER, the honest users can bound the amount of information potentially stolen by an
eavesdropper (Eve). In particular, if the QBER is below a certain security threshold, then Alice and Bob can apply
procedures of error correction and privacy amplification in order to derive a final secret and error-free binary key.
In a collective attack, Eve probes each signal qubit using a fresh ancilla, which is then stored in a cell of a quantum
memory coherently measured at the end of the protocol. In particular, such a coherent measurement is also optimized
on every classical communication used by Alice and Bob during the protocol like, e.g., the basis reconciliation. As
a consequence, Eve has an a posteriori knowledge of the basis (Z or X) which was used for each signal qubit. On
the one hand, Eve can exploit this knowledge in the final detection [7], on the other hand, she cannot exploit it for a
conditional optimization of the signal-ancilla interactions (which, of course, have been already occurred). Since the
usage of the two conjugate bases is perfectly symmetric in the BB84 protocol, the optimal eavesdropping strategy
2should consist in signal-ancilla interactions which are symmetric in the eigenstates of these conjugate bases.
Let us explicitly construct this kind of symmetric interaction. According to the Stinespring dilation theorem [8], the
quantum channel E acting on the signal qubit can be represented by a unitary interaction Uˆ coupling the signal qubit
with two ancillary qubits initially prepared in the vacuum state (such a representation is also minimal and unique
up to partial isometries). Then, for every input u = {0, 1,+,−}, we can write the following signal-ancilla unitary
interaction
Uˆ (|u〉 ⊗ |0, 0〉) = |u〉 |Fu〉+ |u⊕ 1〉 |Du〉 , (1)
where u⊕ 1 = {1, 0,−,+} and the output ancillas (F and D’s) are generally not orthogonal neither normalized. Now,
the condition of symmetry in the four eigenstates |u〉 reduces the number of possible unitaries Uˆ . In particular, by
imposing the conditions
〈Fu |Fu〉 = F , 〈Du |Du〉 = D := 1− F , 〈Fu |Du〉 = 0 , (2)
one makes Uˆ symmetric and Eq. (1) a Schmidt form. The Stinespring dilation of Eq. (1) under the conditions of Eq. (2)
defines the notion of symmetric attack, which is then individual or collective depending on the kind of measurement
performed by Eve on her quantum memory. The corresponding action on the Alice-Bob channel is given by the map
E : |u〉 〈u| → ρB(u) = F |u〉 〈u|+D |u⊕ 1〉 〈u⊕ 1| , (3)
describing a uniform contraction by F − D of the signal states, which is here equivalent to the contraction of the
equator of the Bloch sphere [5]. From Eq. (3) it is clear that parameter F represents the fidelity while D is the
QBER. As a consequence, Alice and Bob’s mutual information is simply given by IAB = 1 − H(D) where H(p) =
−p log2 p− (1− p) log2(1 − p) is the Shannon entropy.
Let us now consider the output state ρE(u) which is received by Eve in the complementary Alice-Eve channel
E˜ : |u〉 〈u| → ρE(u). This is equal to
ρE(u) = |Fu〉 〈Fu|+ |Du〉 〈Du| = F |fu〉 〈fu|+D |du〉 〈du| , (4)
where the normalized states |fu〉 := F−1/2 |Fu〉 and |du〉 := D−1/2 |Du〉 have been introduced. In case of collective
attack, this output state is subject to an optimal coherent measurement involving all the cells of the quantum memory.
Since Eve has the a posteriori knowledge of the basis, her coherent measurement has to discriminate between the two
states of the quantum ensemble
Q =


ρE(u) , p(u) =
1
2
ρE(u⊕ 1) , p(u⊕ 1) = 12
⇒ ρE := ρE(u) + ρE(u⊕ 1)
2
. (5)
It is known that the maximal amount of classical information (accessible information) that Eve can steal from this
ensemble is upper-bounded by the Holevo information
χAE := S(ρE)− S[ρE(u)] + S[ρE(u⊕ 1)]
2
, (6)
where S(ρ) := −Tr (ρ log2 ρ) is the Von Neumann entropy. As a consequence, the secret-key rate is lower bounded by
the Devetak-Winter rate [4]
RDW := IAB − χAE . (7)
Since 〈fu |du〉 = 〈Fu |Du〉 = 0 in Eq. (4), we have that S[ρE(u)] = S[ρE(u⊕1)] = H(D). By exploiting this expression
and IAB = 1−H(D), the Devetak-Winter rate for a symmetric collective attack simply becomes
RDW = 1− S(ρE) , (8)
where only S(ρE) remains to be computed.
Following Gisin et al. [5], let us simplify the structure of the symmetric attack by imposing the additional conditions
〈Fu |Fu⊕1〉 = F cosx , 〈Du |Du⊕1〉 = D cos y , 〈Fu |Du⊕1〉 = 0 , (9)
with x and y real numbers. Such conditions imply
D =
1− cosx
2− cosx+ cos y := D(x, y) , (10)
3so that Uˆ is not only symmetric but also completely determined by two angles x and y. In particular, we can realize
all the conditions in Eqs. (2) and (9) by choosing in Eq. (1) the ancilla states [5]
|F0〉 =


√
F
0
0
0

 , |D0〉 =


0√
D
0
0

 , |F1〉 =


√
F cosx
0
0√
F sinx

 , |D1〉 =


0√
D cos y√
D sin y
0

 . (11)
Let us denote by S(x, y) the symmetric collective attack specified by the interaction of Eq. (11). Then, it is easy to
prove that the attack S(x, x) has a Devetak-Winter rate equal to
RDW = 1− 2H(D) , (12)
which corresponds exactly to the unconditionally-secure key-rate of the BB84 protocol [9] (with unconditional security
threshold D ≃ 11% as given by 1− 2H(D) = 0).
Proof of Eq. (12). In order to prove the rate of Eq. (12) we have to compute the entropy S(ρE) in Eq. (8) by
exploiting the properties of the attack S(x, x), which are simply given by conditions of Eqs. (2) and (9) with x = y.
By introducing the states
ρF :=
1
2
(|fu〉 〈fu|+ |fu⊕1〉 〈fu⊕1|) , ρD := 1
2
(|du〉 〈du|+ |du⊕1〉 〈du⊕1|) , (13)
we can recast the average state ρE of Eq. (5) in the form ρE = FρF +DρD, so that it can be equivalently seen as the
average state of the quantum ensemble
Q˜ =
{
ρF , p(F ) = F
ρD , p(D) = D
. (14)
From Eqs. (2) and (9) we easily derive that ρF and ρD are orthogonal, i.e., Tr(ρF ρD) = 0. As a consequence, we have
χ(Q˜) := S(ρE)− [FS(ρF ) +DS(ρD)] = H(D) . (15)
In order to extract S(ρE) from Eq. (15), we have to compute the two entropies S(ρF ) and S(ρD). For computing
S(ρF ) let us introduce the orthonormal set {|fu〉 ,
∣∣f⊥u 〉}, where ∣∣f⊥u 〉 is an arbitrary vector defined by 〈fu ∣∣f⊥u 〉 = 0
and
〈
f⊥u
∣∣f⊥u 〉 = 1. By using Eq. (9), we can always decompose |fu⊕1〉 = cosx |fu〉 + eiϕ sinx ∣∣f⊥u 〉 with ϕ arbitrary
phase, so that
ρF =
( |fu〉 ∣∣f⊥u 〉 )
(
1+cos
2 x
2
e−iϕ sin 2x
4
eiϕ sin 2x
4
sin
2 x
2
)( 〈fu|〈
f⊥u
∣∣
)
. (16)
By means of a suitable unitary we then get
UˆρF Uˆ
† = λ |Φ−〉 〈Φ−|+ (1− λ) |Φ+〉 〈Φ+| , (17)
where
λ(x) =
1− |cosx|
2
, |Φ±〉 =
e−iϕ (1 + cos 2x± 2 |cosx|) (csc 2x) |fu〉+
∣∣f⊥u 〉
N±
, (18)
andN2± = 1+(1 + cos 2x± 2 |cosx|)2 (csc 2x)2. Since 〈Φ+ |Φ−〉 = 0, we simply achieve S(ρF ) = S(UˆρF Uˆ †) = H [λ(x)].
In order to compute the other entropy S(ρD), we just introduce an analogous orthonormal set {|du〉 ,
∣∣d⊥u 〉} which
leads to the corresponding result S(ρD) = H [λ(y)].
Now, by setting x = y, we clearly have S(ρF ) = S(ρD) = H [λ(x)]. Then, we also have λ(x) = D(x, x) for
−pi/2 ≤ x ≤ pi/2 and λ(x) = 1 −D(x, x) for pi/2 ≤ x ≤ 3pi/2, so that we can always write S(ρF ) = S(ρD) = H(D).
By replacing the latter result in Eq. (15) we finally get S(ρE) = 2H(D) which leads to the rate of Eq. (12). 
4III. THE SIX-STATE PROTOCOL AND ITS SYMMETRIC EAVESDROPPING
In the BB84 protocol the signal states represent the four equidistant poles lying on the equator of the Bloch
sphere. In order to enhance the security, one can then think to saturate the sphere by including the exploitation of
the remaining two poles. This is done in the six-state protocol [10] where also the basis {|R〉 , |L〉} := 2−1/2{|0〉 +
i |1〉 , |0〉− i |1〉} of the third Pauli operator Y = iXZ is exploited in both Alice’s random encoding and Bob’s random
decoding. The six-state protocol is then formulated like the BB84 protocol except that now we have three bases
{Z,X, Y } and, therefore, six possible signal states {|u〉 ; u = 0, 1,+,−, R, L} encoding a logical qubit according to
the mapping 0¯ = |0〉 ∨ |+〉 ∨ |R〉 and 1¯ = |1〉 ∨ |−〉 ∨ |L〉.
Since the six-state protocol is a symmetric extension of the BB84 to the third Pauli operator, we consider the same
extension for the symmetric attacks. This means that an arbitrary symmetric attack against the six-state protocol
is defined by Eqs. (1) and (2) where now u = {0, 1,+,−, R, L}. The corresponding channel is again described by
Eq. (3) which now corresponds to a uniform contraction by F −D of all the Bloch sphere. It is trivial to check that a
symmetric collective attack against the six-state protocol is characterized by the same Devetak-Winter rate of Eq. (8),
exactly as before [11].
Let us construct a simple example for the explicit computation of this rate. We can simplify the structure of the
attack by imposing the conditions of Eq. (9) for all the bases, i.e., for u = {0, 1,+,−, R, L}. All these conditions
imply now Eq. (10) together with 1+F cosx−D cos y = 2F , which are simultaneously satisfied if and only if y = pi/2.
As a consequence, we have
D =
1− cosx
2− cosx := D(x) , (19)
and the unitary interaction Uˆ is completely determined by a single angle x. In particular, we can realize all the
previous conditions by choosing the ancillas of Eq. (11) with y = pi/2, i.e.,
|F0〉 =


√
F
0
0
0

 , |D0〉 =


0√
D
0
0

 , |F1〉 =


√
F cosx
0
0√
F sinx

 , |D1〉 =


0
0√
D
0

 , (20)
where also |D0〉 and |D1〉 are orthogonal. Let us denote by S˜(x) the symmetric collective attack specified by the
interaction of Eq. (20). Then, it is easy to prove that S˜(x) has a Devetak-Winter rate equal to
RDW = 1 +
3D
2
log2
D
2
+
(
1− 3D
2
)
log2
(
1− 3D
2
)
, (21)
which corresponds exactly to the unconditionally-secure key-rate of the six-state protocol [12] (with unconditional
security threshold D ≃ 12.6%).
Proof of Eq. (21). In order to get the result we have to compute S(ρE) for the simple attack S˜(x). Eve’s output
state ρE(u) has the same form of Eq. (4). Thus, the average state ρE can be again recasted in terms of the states
ρD and ρF of Eq. (13), in such a way to represent the same quantum ensemble Q˜ of Eq. (14). As a consequence, the
entropy S(ρE) can be again extracted from of Eq. (15), where the computation of S(ρF ) and S(ρD) is now different
since we have y = pi/2 and not x = y as before. The computation of S(ρD) is very easy thanks to the orthogonality
which now exists between the D’s states. Since 〈du |du⊕1〉 = 〈Du |Du⊕1〉 = 0, we have in fact S(ρD) = H(1/2) = 1.
The computation of S(ρF ) is the same as before except that now the eigenvalue λ(x) of Eq. (18) is differently connected
to the QBER D(x) of Eq. (19). It is easy to check that λ(x) = [1−D(x)]−1D(x)/2 for −pi/2 ≤ x ≤ pi/2 and λ(x) =
1 − {[1−D(x)]−1D(x)/2} for pi/2 ≤ x ≤ 3pi/2, so that we can always write S(ρF ) = H(λ) = H
[
(1−D)−1D/2].
By inserting the latter result and S(ρD) = 1 into Eq. (15), one gets S(ρE) = D+H(D) + (1−D)H
[
(1−D)−1D/2]
and, therefore, the Devetak-Winter rate
RDW = (1 −D)
{
1−H
[
D
2(1−D)
]}
−H(D) , (22)
which is equivalent to the result of Eq. (21). 
5IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have considered very simple collective attacks against the BB84 and six-state protocols, which
are constructed by trivially extending the individual symmetric attacks of Gisin et al. [5]. Such symmetric collective
attacks have been proven to be sufficiently strong in order to minimize the Devetak-Winter rates of these protocols.
In fact, it has been shown how to construct simple examples able to reach their unconditionally-secure key-rates. Our
results can be useful in the cryptoanalysis of other QKD protocols which are based on the symmetric exploitation of
the vertices of regular polygons or polyhedrons embedded in the Bloch sphere.
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